State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2006

Karan Capoor, Carbon Finance Unit, World Bank*
Philippe Ambrosi, Development Economics Research Group, World Bank*
Based on data and insights provided by Evolution Markets LLC and Natsource LLC
see Note *

Read the full report (216 Kb PDF) | View the 2007 Report

What a year this has been! The overall value of the global aggregated carbon markets was over US$10 billion in 2005. In the first quarter of 2006, overall transactions worth US$7.5 billion had led some to predict that this new financial market would be valued at between US$25-30 billion in 2006, although the authors view such projections with caution.

These values had been driven by soaring prices in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) market for Phase I European Union Allowances (EUAs). EUAs worth US$8.2 billion traded in 2005, which corresponded to 322 million tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (tCO₂e) and represented almost a forty-fold increase over the previous years’ volumes. It is important to note that these numbers reflected financial transactions for allowances, which is quite different from the physical exchange of allowance certificates for compliance.

The strong price signal in the EU market raised price expectations in the project-based markets as well, where the demand from European and Japanese companies was very strong [Note 1]. In 2005, 374 million tCO₂e, mainly of Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs), were transacted at a value of US$2.7 billion with an average price climbing over US$7.23. These numbers reflected an increase of more than three times above the previous year’s volumes from project-based transactions and over five times above the previous year’s value. In the first three months of 2006, prices for project-based emission reductions soared with an average reported price of US$11.45 per tCO₂e for the 79 million tons transacted in the first three months of 2006 alone, corresponding to a value of nearly US$0.9 billion.

Developing countries began to participate meaningfully in the market and brought real emission reductions to the table. The market share of Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) credits from developing countries was about 49.2% of overall volumes transacted globally. In the first three months of 2006, the CDM’s market share of the overall carbon market volume was about 27.2%. Joint Implementation (JI) remained a very small contributor at about 4.7% of project-based volumes (about 2% of the entire volume of carbon markets), at relatively low prices reflecting the perception of regulatory and institutional risks. European and Japanese private entities dominated the buy-side of the market, scooping up nearly 90% of all transacted project emission reductions in 2005 and in 2006 alike, while China was the dominant player on the sell-side.

The evidence from the market, documented in our report, is that price signals in the carbon markets have stimulated innovation, especially in developing countries. A new urgency enveloped business managers in developing countries last year who had an incentive to reduce emissions. A quick look at our market data — and the pipeline of CDM Project Design Documents (PDD) — confirms that the lowest-cost options, i.e. those involving the so-called industrial gases (i.e. HFCs) are the first asset classes to be systematically tapped globally, followed by nitrous oxide, and so on.

The capital markets also responded. A growing number of companies successfully raised capital for those efforts through IPOs on the London Alternative Investment Market (AIM) or attracted hedge fund capital to arbitrage between markets. Financial innovation thrived as a plethora of clever carbon-based securities and hedge instruments became available to hedge carbon price risk against price volatility in other commodity markets. Brokers, consultants, carbon procurement funds, hedge fund managers and other buyers scoured the globe for opportunities to buy credits associated with projects that reduce emissions in developing countries. Innovative structures that managed both down-side and up-side carbon price risk and reduced delivery risk began to emerge, which aligned purchases of carbon with an interest in the underlying project, through equity, debt, mezzanine finance, technology or operating agreements. The City of London developed as a sort of hub for many of these activities and a vibrant new climate services industry developed.

EUAs influenced, and were, in turn, influenced by European markets for natural gas, petroleum, power, fuel and weather derivatives. Carbon’s interaction with those related markets — some of which are not yet fully competitive — had an impact on prices in those markets. Business decisions began to be made with the price of carbon as a criterion. The new carbon markets exerted a global influence on other parts of the economy and society at large. Price volatility in carbon had significant impacts on values of European power companies as well as the stock price
of chemical companies. In the case of Rhodia, a French chemical company, for instance, the stock price increased 35% in the eight days following regulatory approval of a proposed CDM project methodology. In contrast, the same stock price declined 16% as news about the verified emissions reports of European countries leaked to the market in late April 2006.

The authors welcome the development that new capital and innovation have entered the carbon markets ever since carbon became a commodity with value. Reducing climate change risk and promoting investment in clean energy systems is a long-term venture requiring billions of dollars of annual investment: it is estimated that about US$ 40 billion annually of incremental capital will be required for climate change mitigation in developing countries over the next two decades [Note 2]. This will require long-term solutions, long-term capital and long-term legally-binding constraints. It is our view that private capital markets are the primary global force that can generate enough long-term resources in order for the world to transition to a future with cleaner energy and a safer climate.

Long-term carbon constraints, while necessary, are not, however, a sufficient condition for the scale of change required. In order for the market to generate sustainable long-term capital at the scale required, the market needs a strong compliance system, more transparent and credible processes about formulating and releasing emissions data, and clear signals about future policy direction. Only then will the market attract the long-term capital required for this change.

The market correction in the EU ETS in the last few days of April 2006 wiped out over half of its market value. Wholesale German power prices also fell on the news that several countries in Europe were longer carbon or less short carbon than had been expected. We will not delve into all the reasons for the EUA price correction here, except to state that market fundamentals should drive value, not momentum.

The fundamental demand in the EU ETS Phase I market is more or less at levels it was when EU allocations were made, although weather and fuel prices may have led to seasonal variations in the positions of power companies. The official release of verified emissions reports from EU Member States on May 15, 2006, will clarify the position for EU ETS Phase I. In early May, EU 2008 futures rebounded to around €20-24 as the market focused on the likelihood of tighter compliance caps in EU ETS Phase II, reflecting the commitment of Member States to meeting their Kyoto Protocol targets.

In the immediate future, the prospects for the project-based market are quite solid, provided the EU does not erect any barriers limiting entry for CDM and JI imports for Phase II. Several EU governments had already made commitments to purchase credits for Kyoto compliance last year. Demand from the Japanese private sector remains largely unchanged and its Government announced new plans to purchase emission reductions on the market. Canada’s recent announcements [Note 3], while significant for overall demand, did not move the EUA market at all when they were made (and in any event, Canadian buyers have been largely absent from CDM and JI transactions for the past year).

On the supply side, the outlook actually improved considerably as project-based reductions began to make a significant contribution to the compliance markets, albeit with limited 2005-07 delivery. The ability to harvest sufficient volumes of CERs should create enough comfort for installations facing more stringent EU ETS Phase II caps. CDM’s strong project pipeline should also encourage all UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol Parties, other compliance markets, e.g. RGGI, voluntary markets, e.g. CCX, and corporate and retail buyers that developing countries can and will participate meaningfully in climate change mitigation.

Markets now price carbon and this has created the opportunity for the private sector to efficiently support investments to reduce emissions. Binding emission reduction commitments not only gave rise to these markets, but the level of future caps and the integrity of the market’s information transparency and compliance systems will continue to influence to what extent new capital will be mobilized to support climate mitigation. The success of the carbon markets will ultimately be judged by their ability to achieve their environmental goals and preventing climate change.

For this, clear market signals for credible constraints need to be sent. The first test of this is whether regulators will set the EU ETS Phase II caps at credible levels to enable the EU Member States to meet Kyoto objectives. The next test is whether there can be a long-term signal for post-2012 commitments from Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In this context, we welcome other drivers of the global (if fragmented) carbon markets, such as the imminent establishment of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) in the North-Eastern United States, the continued operation of the New South Wales carbon market in Australia and growing liquidity in the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX), as well as corporate and retail markets.

Note *: The findings and opinions expressed in this paper are the sole responsibility of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA) or of IETA member companies, who cannot be held responsible for the accuracy, completeness, or reliability of the content of this study or non-infringement
of third parties’ intellectual property rights. The findings and opinions expressed in this paper also do not necessarily reflect the views of the World Bank, its executive directors, or the countries they represent; nor do they necessarily reflect the views of the World Bank Carbon Finance Unit Team, or of any of the Participants in the Carbon Funds managed by the World Bank. Finally, findings and opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily represent the views and opinions of Evolution Markets LLC or of Natsource LLC. The CF-Assist program of the World Bank Carbon Finance Unit funded this research. [back]

Note 1: The “EUA-effect” appeared to have been felt in unconnected markets such as the U.S. voluntary Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) and in Australia’s New South Wales (NSW) market, where carbon prices in those non-Kyoto markets have also seen upward movement. [back]

Note 2: See Clean Energy and Development: Towards an Investment Framework, Development Committee, IMF and the World Bank, April 2006. [back]

Note 3: The Government recently announced that it will revise its national plan of action, which raises uncertainty as to what extent Canada will make use of the Kyoto Mechanisms to meet its emission reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. [back]